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This survey article will again review changes in Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Law brought about by the Legislature and the appellate courts.
Although legislative changes were fewer in 1981 than in previous sessions,
the volume of cases in both trial and appellate courts continued to
increase.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
During 1981 the 67th Legislature did not make any extensive changes in
the Workers' Compensation Act' (the Act) although there were several sig-
nificant amendments dealing with specific sections.
Preferential Settings-Trial Courts. One new statute, article 2166a, re-
quires "regular and frequent" preferential settings for appeals of final rul-
ings and decisions of the Industrial Accident Board. 2 Workers'
compensation cases now will be preceded in order of preference only by:
(1) temporary injunctions, (2) criminal actions against defendants who are
detained in jail, and (3) election contests and suit under the Texas Election
Code. Article 2166a further provides that the trial courts shall observe the
preference set out in the statute in ruling on, hearing, and trying matters
pending before them.3
Statutory Total and Permanent Incapacity--Lfetime Benefts. If an injured
worker has sustained any of the following injuries the incapacity shall con-
clusively be held to be total and permanent:
1. the total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes;
2. the loss of both feet at or above the ankle;
3. the loss of both hands at or above the wrists;
4. a similar loss of one hand and one foot;
5. an injury to the spine resulting in permanent and complete paral-
ysis of both arms or both legs or of one arm and one leg;
6. an injury to the skull resulting in incurable insanity or imbecility.4
* B.A. Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Irving, Texas.
** B.S. University of Texas; J.D., University of Texas. Assistant Attorney General,
Austin, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8206-8309i (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982).
2. Id art. 2166a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
3. Id
4. Id art. 8306, § Ila (Vernon 1967).
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For those injuries occurring before June 18, 1981, the injured worker's cash
benefit period is limited to 401 weeks.5 The legislature, however, has now
provided lifetime benefits for employees who sustain any of the injuries
outlined in section 1 a of the Act after June 18, 1981.6 The new amend-
ments also provide that no attorney's fee may be allowed in cases in which
the employee receives lifetime benefits for the injuries outlined in section
11 a if the insurance carrier admits liability while the case is pending before
the Industrial Accident Board and makes periodic payments.7 If the insur-
ance carrier contests liability, however, attorney's fees are allowed only by
periodic payments and not in a lump sum.8
State Employees-Out-of-State Injuries. Article 8309g of the Act provides
workers' compensation insurance coverage for state employees.9 This stat-
ute was amended in 1981 to provide workers' compensation coverage for
state employees regardless of the state in which they might be hired and
regardless of whether or not they may have been injured outside the State
of Texas.10 An employee who elects to pursue remedies provided by the
District of Columbia or another state in which an injury occurs is not enti-
tled to benefits under article 8309g.1
Voluntary Compensation Benefits-Industrial Accident Board Jurisdiction.
The Texas Act does not provide for mandatory coverage by every em-
ployer. The law specifically excludes injuries sustained by domestic ser-
vants, casual employees engaged in employment incidental to a personal
residence, farm laborers, ranch laborers, and the employees of any person,
firm, or corporation operating in a steam, electric, street, or interurban
railway as a common carrier.' 2 Voluntary compensation, however, has
been allowed, and during the past session, the legislature amended the Act
to provide that claims for compensation benefits under voluntary policies
of insurance are now subject to the Industrial Accident Board's jurisdic-
tion. 13 This amendment should eliminate any questions about the admin-
istrative handling of voluntary claims.
Fraud Investigation-Attorney General. The Texas Attorney General has
authority to conduct investigations dealing with any allegation of fraud on
the part of any employer, employee, attorney, person, or facility furnishing
medical services, or insurance company or its representative relating to any
5. Id art. 8306, § 10 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982).
6. Id art. 8306, § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
7. Id art. 8306, § 10(c).
8. Id art. 8306, § 10(d).
9. Id art. 8309g.
10. Id art. 8309g, § 17. Section 17 was added in 1981 as a new section, and prior case
law does not address the question of whether out-of-state employees could recover.
11. Id
12. Id art. 8306, § 2 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982).
13. Id art. 8308, § 18 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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claim.14 The most recent legislation now allows the attorney general to
issue "civil investigative demands" for the production of materials relevant
to his investigation.15 Any person who removes, destroys or alters re-
quested documentary material may be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. ' 6
Other amendments to the Act dealt with political subdivisions and state
employees.' 7 The term "employee" was amended to include volunteer
firefighters, policemen, emergency medical personnel and other volunteers
who are specifically named by the political subdivision.' 8 These persons
are now entitled to full medical benefits and the minimum compensation
payments provided under the law.' 9 In addition, corrective changes were
made in article 8309g pertaining to state employees, employees of political
subdivisions and highway department employees to make other parts of
the Act applicable to the statutory scheme governing benefits for public
employees. 20
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Course of Employment. The Texas Act covers an employee's injury only if
the injury is sustained in the course of employment. 21 In order for an
employee to show that he sustained an injury in the course of his employ-
ment, Texas law requires proof that the injury occurred while the worker
was engaged in the furtherance of the employer's affairs or business and
that the injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and
originated in the employer's work, business, trade, or profession. 22 This
past year the Texas Supreme Court upheld a jury finding awarding cover-
age under the Act in Deatherage v. International Insurance Co. 23 That case
was brought by the widow of an employee whose body was found amid
burned remnants of his trailer on the plant premises. The deceased em-
ployee, Deatherage, performed security duty at an asphalt mixing plant,
and lived in his own trailer parked on the plant premises. Although the
employer did not require Deatherage to live on the premises, he knew,
from a prior job Deatherage had performed, that Deatherage would live
on the premises. Deatherage had no specific duties to perform and was not
required to be at any particular place on the premises while on duty, but
was instructed to watch the plant during the hours of darkness. The exact
time of death and the duties being performed were not ascertained. The
Austin court of civil appeals concluded that there was no evidence to sup-
port the jury finding that Deatherage died in the course of employment
14. Id art. 8307, § 9a(e)(1).
15. Id art. 8307, § 9a(e)(3)-(5).
16. Id art. 8307, § 9a(e)(4)(A).
17. Id art. 8309g-8309h.
18. Id art. 8309h, § 1(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
19. Id
20. Id art. 8309g, § 15(a).
21. Id art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
22. Id
23. 615 S.W.2d 181, 183-84 (Tex. 1981).
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and entered judgment that the widow take nothing. 24
The supreme court reversed, holding that the court of civil appeals erro-
neously restricted Deatherage's employment to specific duties and fixed
hours of employment. 25 Although the evidence showed that Deatherage
was paid on the basis of ten hours a day, seven days a week, the court
found that the jury could reasonably infer that he was performing security
duty for his employer at all times he was on the premises. 26 The court
affirmed the rule applied in the case of an "unexplained death" that
presumes that an accident arose out of and in the course of employment
when an employee is found dead at a place where his duties required him
to be, or where he might properly have been in the performance of his
duties, during the hours of his work, and there is no evidence that he was
not engaged in his employer's business. 27 The rule's application, however,
was found unnecessary in Deatherage since the jury had found that the
deceased employee was injured in the course and scope of his
employment. 28
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Dryden the Beaumont
court of civil appeals held that the evidence presented in a workers' com-
pensation proceeding by the widow of a field engineer was sufficient to
support the jury's finding that the deceased employee had been traveling
from one work project to another when he suffered insulin shock, and was
involved in a fatal collision. 29 The evidence showed that the deceased
worked more than one jobsite at a time and that on the day of his death he
had an auto collision while traveling on a road between jobsites. Other
evidence supporting the finding showed that the deceased was on twenty-
four hour call, as well as working weekends, and was not in the practice of
coming home for lunch. Furthermore, a fellow employee had seen the
deceased loading the truck, and the deceased had told him that he was
going to another job. The court affirmed the finding that the deceased was
acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death.30
Injuries sustained while going to and from work are generally not com-
pensable. 31 The "access doctrine," however, is a well settled exception to
24. International Ins. Co. v. Deatherage, 606 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980).
25. 615 S.W.2d at 183.
26. Id.
27. Id. This rule was stated in Scott v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 285, 288
(Tex. 1974).
28. 615 S.W.2d at 183.
29. 612 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
30. Id at 225.
31. See Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1974); Shelton
v. Standard Ins. Co. 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Borrom, 365
S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W.
72 (1922); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Lee, 596 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ); Dishman v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 440 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1969, writ ref d n.r.e.); Viney v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 82 S,W.2d 1088 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1935, writ refd).
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this general rule.32 Under the access doctrine, an employee is deemed to
be in the course of employment if (1) the injury occurs within a reasonable
margin of time necessary for passing to and from the place of work both
before and after the actual working hours of service, and (2) the injury
occurs at a place intended by the employer for use by the employee in
passing to and from the actual place of service on premises owned or con-
trolled by the employer, or so closely related to the employer's premises as
to be fairly treated as part thereof.33 In Texas Employers'InsuranceAssoci-
ation v. Dean the El Paso court of civil appeals held that an employee's
injury occurring on an employer owned parking lot located at the place of
employment is compensable as though the injury had occurred on the em-
ployer's main premises when the employee is authorized to park in the lot
and is either going to or from work. 34 In Dean, a K-Mart employee was
assaulted in the parking lot by a purse snatcher after she left work. After
deciding that the access doctrine applied to the case, the court then consid-
ered whether the intentional injury exclusion in the Act would preclude
recovery. 35 Under this exclusion, an injury is not compensable if it is
"caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee be-
cause of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an em-
ployee, or because of his employment. ' 36 The court applied the
"positional risk doctrine" that states that if an employee is assaulted on the
premises of the employer when the environment contributed to the risk
and when she would not have been assaulted except for her presence on
such premises, any injuries sustained by the employee are sustained in the
course of employment. 37
In reviewing the evidence, the court seemed to place particular reliance
on the fact that Mrs. Dean was wearing a jacket bearing the store name
and that the man who assaulted her had just been in the store where he
had shown interest in the money in her cash drawer. 38 The court held that
Mrs. Dean's injuries were received in the course of her employment and
did not result because of reasons personal to her.39
In another case considering scope of employment, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the Amarillo court of appeals' holding in Biggs v. United
States Fire Insurance Co. 40 The court of civil appeals had denied benefits
32. See Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. 1974);
Kelty v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
33. See Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 111, 246 S.W. 72, 74
(1922); Texas Employers' Ass'n v. Lee 596 S.W.2d 942, 945-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980,
no writ).
34. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dean, 604 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1980, no writ).
35. Id at 349-50.
36. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art, 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
37. 604 S.W.2d at 350.
38. Id
39. Id
40. 611 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1981). The supreme court reversed and remanded this case to
the intermediate court that then reinstated the jury's finding that the claimant had sustained
1982]
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to a part time law clerk employed in the law offices of Tom Upchurch, Jr.4 1
The clerk was injured while making repairs to an apartment roof owned
by an associate in Upchurch's firm. The evidence showed that while em-
ployed by Upchurch, Biggs performed a wide variety of duties, consisting
primarily of running errands for Upchurch and other employees. Many of
these errands were personal errands for Upchurch and his associates, such
as changing tires, picking up and delivering packages, watering plants at
an associate's house, and picking up rents from an apartment manager of a
unit owned by one of the associates. Some evidence also showed that
Upchurch was aware of these personal errands. Biggs was never instructed
by anyone not to perform these personal errands. Biggs turned in his time
for all these personal errands and was paid by the bookkeeper from Tom
Upchurch, Jr.'s account.
In reaching its decision, the supreme court reviewed the "temporary di-
rection" exception to the general rule that an injury must be sustained in
the course of employment to be compensable. 42 Under this exception, if
an employee is directed by his employer to perform a task outside his em-
ployer's usual business and is then injured, his injury is deemed to be sus-
tained in the course of his employment. 43 The court recognized that the
purpose underlying the enactment of this exception was to eliminate a di-
lemma that would otherwise face an employee when instructed to perform
a task outside his employer's usual business.44 The employee would either
have to obey his employer and lose compensation coverage or disobey and
lose his job.45 Biggs was faced with this very dilemma.
The court of appeals held that there was no evidence that the associate
who directed Biggs to repair the roof had authority as Upchurch's agent to
direct Biggs' action beyond the scope of Upchurch's affairs or profession.46
On appeal, Biggs urged that the court had errored in disregarding evidence
of the associate's apparent authority from Upchurch to use him for per-
sonal errands. Biggs argued that as a result of this authority, he remained
in the course of employment under the "temporary direction" exception
while performing these errands at the associate's direction. The supreme
court agreed with Biggs' argument holding that there was some evidence
that the associate's use of Biggs was within the limits of his apparent au-
thority, and that the "temporary direction" exception applied to bring
Biggs' injury within the scope of employment with Upchurch.47
injuries in the course of employment. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Biggs, 614 S.W.2d 496
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ). For a discussion of the first decision of the
Amarillo court of appeals in Biggs, see Collins, Worker's Compensation, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 273, 275-76 (1981).
41. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Biggs, 601 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980).
42. 611 SW.2d at 627.
43. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
44. 611 S.W.2d at 628.
45. Id
46. 601 S.W.2d at 135.
47. 611 SW.2d at 629.
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Employee Versus Independent Contractor. Texas workers' compensation
law defines an employee as any person in the service of another under any
contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written.48 Recently, in
Carnes v. Transport Insurance Co. the El Paso court of civil appeals af-
firmed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the insurer on the
ground that the claimant was not an employee at the time of the acci-
dent.49 Although Carnes, the claimant, was a truck driver for H. G.
Courtney, he filed his claim against the lessor of Courtney's truck, the
Thrasher Trucking Company located in Monahans, Texas. Before
Thrasher actually completed the lease agreement with Courtney, the truck
had to pass inspection. In order to be employed by Thrasher and continue
as the driver, Carnes was required to complete an employment application,
pass a written test and a driving test, have a valid driver's license, and have
a valid Department of Transportation physical examination card. On Sep-
tember 27, 1978, Carnes was injured while en route to Monahans, where
he anticipated making his first haul the following morning. On the date of
the accident, Carnes had not completed the employment application nor
taken the required tests. Although Carnes testified that when he started his
trip to Monahans on the evening of September 27 he thought he was work-
ing for and would be paid by Thrasher, the court held that there was no
evidence of any agreement for Thrasher to make payment on that date
either to the driver or the owner of the truck.50 In effect, there was no
contract of employment in this case.
Medical Causation and Heart Attacks. Each survey years, the causal link
between job conditions and resulting incapacity provides some of the most
interesting and challenging cases in the workers' compensation field. 51
The past survey year was no exception. The intensity of the medical cau-
sation disputes reached a new zenith in Schaefer v. Texas Employers' Insur-
ance Association .52 In a 5-4 ruling the Texas Supreme Court held there
was no evidence of any causal connection between Bobby G. Schaefer's
employment as a plumber and his contracting "Group III, mycobacteria
intracellularis."'5 3
Schaefer had worked as a plumber primarily in rural areas of Nueces
County and was required to crawl and tunnel underneath houses to repair
48. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
49. 615 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
50. Id
51. See, e.g., Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976); Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1975); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518
S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975); Webb v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974);
Olsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 ('rex. 1972); Griffin v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 ('rex. 1969); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Kneten,
440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969).
52. 612 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1980). For a discussion of the court of civil appeals' opinion
in Schaefer, see Collins, supra note 40, at 285-86.
53. 612 S.W.2d at 205. This disease is sometimes referred to as "atypical tuberculosis,"
a rare disease that attacks lung tissue, scarring the lungs to the point that they cease to
function. Id at 200.
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or install plumbing. He often worked in soil contaminated with the feces
of birds, other fowl, sheep, goats, dogs, cats, and humans. Although the
etiology of mycobacteria intracellularis is uncertain, there is a higher inci-
dence of the disease among farmers who work in dirty environments, espe-
cially those contaminated by fowl droppings. 54 The plaintiffs case was
supported primarily by the testimony of Schaefer's treating physician, and
the question before the court was whether his expert's testimony consti-
tuted "some evidence" to support the jury's finding that Schaefer was ex-
posed to or contracted the disease while in the course and scope of his
employment.
Writing for the majority Justice Denton outlined the Texas Supreme
Court's previous rulings in causal connection cases.55 The court noted that
the "no evidence" determination does not turn on any "magic" words or
phrases that may or may not be used by the expert.56 The plaintiff's expert
had testified that, in his opinion, based on reasonable medical probability,
Schaefer's disease did constitute an "occupational" disease. Despite the
physician's testimony, the supreme court ruled that there was a crucial de-
ficiency in the proof of causation; the particular strain of mycobacterium
intracellularis from which Schaefer suffered was not identified, the manner
in which the disease was transmitted to Schaefer was unknown, and there
was no evidence that the bacteria was present in the soil where Schaefer
worked or even in Nueces County.57
The Texas Supreme Court consistently has ruled that the mere fact that
a heart attack or other disabling condition occurs on an employer's prem-
ises is not sufficient to support recovery under the workers' compensation
law. 58 The heart attack injury and death cases continue to provide a
heated battleground between claimants and carriers in the workers' com-
pensation arena. Heart attack "skirmishes" were nowhere better illus-
trated than in the case of Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dickie.59 James
Rhabb Dickie suffered a heart attack either before or during a lunch break
while on his employer's premises. Dickie was 45 years old and had
worked in various phases of the construction trade for about thirty years.
On the day the heart attack occurred he was employed as a carpenter on
an office building job. The factual testimony indicated that Dickie had
been engaged in sawing and putting up sheets of masonite and cedar.
Dickie testified that on three different occasions he experienced chest pain
54. Id at 201.
55. Id at 202. See Stodghill v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.
1979); Parker v. Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324
(Tex. 1968); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
56. 612 S.W.2d at 202.
57. Id at 204.
58. Olsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972) (no recovery
for heart attack absent showing of strain, exertion or shock precipitating heart attack); Insur-
ance Co. of N. America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969) (heart attack after electric
shock compensable); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W.556
(1916) (scope of act limited to accidental injuries).
59. 609 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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while doing some hand sawing. The insurance carrier contended that
there must be a showing that Dickie's heart attack was produced by
"strain, over-exertion or shock."' 60 The insurance carrier further argued
that in this case there was no showing of strain or overexertion causing the
heart attack in question.
Citing Henderson v. Travelers Insurance Co. 6 1 the Waco court of civil
appeals indicated that, although there must be a showing of "strain or
over-exertion" in heart attack cases, no showing of unusual strain or exer-
tion was necessarily required.62 The court stated that the normal strain or
exertion involved in one's work was sufficient if the work was generally
physically taxing. 63 In this case Dickie testified that although his work was
light compared to other things, it did take strength, exercise, and was phys-
ically exertive. The court further pointed out that the worker's treating
physician testified that a combination of the work activities, cold tempera-
ture, and the worker's pre-existing coronary disease combined to cause the
heart attack in question.64 The appellate court, therefore, ruled that the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict in
favor of the injured worker.65 In Texas General Indemnity Co. v.
Dougharty the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury's finding that a truck driver sustained a ruptured aneurysm while
straining to place a tarpaulin over a load of lumber.66 The employee,
Dougharty, was working with the tarpaulin when he felt his neck pop at
the base, and thereafter he became dizzy and had a severe headache.
Dougharty was hospitalized later that day, and remained under treatment
until he died. The treating physician's testimony was allowed to establish
the causal connection between the rupture and Dougharty's exertion at
work even though the doctor was not certain that the strain at work caused
the aneurysm to rupture.67
Good Cause. Appellate review of cases involving "good cause" seems to
be on the decline, at least compared with past survey years. The Act re-
quires an injured worker to give notice of his injury to his employer within
thirty days and to the insurance company within six months.68 If notice of
the injury is not given within those time periods, then the injured worker
has the burden of proving "good cause" for the failure to give timely no-
tice.69 One of the reasons frequently asserted by claimants as "good cause"
for late filings is that they relied on representations that everything would
60. Id at 876 (citing Bean v. Hardware Mut. Cas. 349 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court disagreed with the appellant's interpretation of
the Bean case, and failed to see its applicability. 609 S.W.2d at 876.
61. 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976).




66. 606 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
67. Id
68. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
69. Id; see also Lee v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Corp., 530 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1975).
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be taken care of made by their employer or the insurance carrier. If such a
representation is established in the evidence by the claimant and such evi-
dence is believed by the jury, then it is legally sufficient to justify delay in
filing the claim.70
The injured worker in Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Villanueva7 1 was
not only successful in establishing that he relied on his employer's repre-
sentations that everything was taken care of, but was also able to show that
he had received a significant letter from the insurance carrier. Following
surgery on his knee, Roberto Villanueva received a lump sum payment
from the insurance company accompanied by a letter that assured him that
his case was still open and requested that he call the company or the board
if he required more treatment. 72 The court ruled that this letter, plus the
employer's representations constituted sufficient evidence to support the
submission of a special issue concerning "good cause," and to uphold the
affirmative finding of "good cause" on appeal.73
A widow in Texas Employer's Insurance Association v. Tobias74 was not
so lucky in asserting a claim for statutory death benefits, despite the fact
that the attorney she initially retained subsequently was suspended for two
years for professional incompetence in other matters.75 Mariana Tobias
hired Jose Olivares to represent her and her six minor children for work-
ers' compensation death benefits arising out of the death of her husband,
Frutosa Tobias. Olivares never did anything toward prosecuting the
claim, and Mrs. Tobias sought another lawyer to help her. The State Bar
sought to disbar Olivares, who already was suspended from the practice of
law for two years. Mrs. Tobias asked the appellate court to create an ex-
ception to the general rule that a claim must be filed timely since, she con-
tended, her lawyer was professionally incompetent. The Eastland court
rejected this argument stating that there were no jury findings that
Olivares was incompetent to handle workers' compensation claims during
the period in which he represented Mrs. Tobias. 76 The court observed in
passing that Mrs. Tobias was not entirely without a remedy since she could
recover the benefits to which she would have been entitled from the attor-
ney, Jose Olivares, and that further, she could seek damages under the
Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act. 77
70. See Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 207 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1948).
71. 619 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
72. Id at 16. The letter read: "THIS CASE REMAINS OPEN BEFORE THE IN-
DUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD. Please call our office or the Board if your [sic] require
additional medical treatment or become disabled as a result of this injury." Id
73. Id at 17.
74. 614 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ dism'd).
75. The general rule is that the lawyer employed to prosecute a claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits is the agent of the client, and his action or inaction in filing the notice of
injury or claim for death benefits is attributable to the client. See Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Wermske, 162 Tex. 540, 548, 349 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex. 1961).
76. 614 S.W.2d at 902.
77. Id at 903; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982). See
also Debakey v. Staggs, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
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Medical Benefits. The Act provides that the injured worker shall be fur-
nished with all medical services reasonably required to cure and relieve
him from the effects naturally resulting from an on-the-job injury.78 Dis-
putes continue to arise in appellate cases indicating that the extent of the
carrier's obligation to provide necessary medical services has not been
finally decided.
In Peeples v. Home Indemnity Co. 79 the employee sustained a knee in-
jury that necessitated surgery. The orthopedic surgeon treated the injured
worker for a period of time and then referred him to a psychiatrist for
additional care and treatment. At trial, the injured worker offered testi-
mony from the psychiatrist relating to the nature of his treatment and the
reasonableness and necessity of such treatment. The insurance carrier ob-
jected to the psychiatrist's testimony on the ground that there was no
pleading to support its introduction. The trial court agreed with the car-
rier, and excluded the psychiatrist's diagnosis that flowed from the psychi-
atric examination.
The appellate court ruled that the injured worker had the right to pres-
ent evidence as to the reasonableness and necessity of all medical treat-
ment flowing from his injury, including psychiatric testimony.s° The
carrier's argument that there was no pleading to support the admissibility
of psychiatric testimony was rejected since there was a pleading which spe-
cifically sought recovery of necessary medical and hospital expenses in
connection with the worker's injury.8' The trial court judgment in favor of
the insurance carrier on the medical expense issue was reversed and re-
manded for a new trial.82
In another case, Julia 0. Sanchez sustained an on-the-job injury but a
take-nothing judgment was entered against her since she failed to establish
that the compensation benefits she had already received were less than her
recovery under the jury's verdict. 83 Sanchez had made a claim for nursing
services, and the jury found that such services were reasonably required as
a result of her injury. The appellate court observed that the record conclu-
sively established that the insurance company did not, after notice, furnish
the nursing services that were reasonably required as a result of her in-
jury.84 Severing the claim for nursing services from the remainder of the
judgment, the appellate court reversed and remanded that part of the judg-
ment disallowing any recovery for nursing services.85
Often an injured worker's bill for medical care and treatment will not
78. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
79. 617 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
80. Id at 276.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Sanchez v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 618 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1981, no writ).
84. Id at 841.
85. Id at 842. Citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 320, the court noted that a claim for nursing
services included within a claim for incapacity benefits was a severable issue for which a
partial new trial could be granted. Id at 842.
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actually make its way into the Industrial Accident Board's file or the insur-
ance carrier's file. These "late" bills must be timely filed with the Indus-
trial Accident Board in order to enforce the carrier's obligation to pay
them. This lesson was brought home in Daniels v. Travelers Insurance
Co..86 Daniels sustained an injury on July 31, 1978, and a Board award
was entered on December 22, 1978. No appeal was taken, and thus it be-
came a "final award" pursuant to section 5 of article 8307.87 The final
award made no specific mention of any medical expenses; consequently,
the insurance carrier refused payment on a bill for medical expenses in-
curred prior to the date of the final award. Daniels then filed a claim with
the Industrial Accident Board for payment of the medical bill in question,
and the Board found that the bill was incurred prior to the date of a final
award and thus was not timely filed. The trial court granted the insurance
carrier's motion for summary judgment but the appellate court ruled that
the proper disposition should have been to dismiss the action since the trial
court had no jurisdiction.88 The court ruled that the Industrial Accident
Board's disposition was actually a dismissal, on jurisdictional grounds, of a
payment claim not timely filed, and since jurisdiction was not timely in-
voked before the Industrial Accident Board, the trial court had no jurisdic-
tion.89 Because the trial court had no jurisdiction, the appellate court
ruled that it too had no jurisdiction.90
Under the rule announced in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Seelbach, an
insurance company must timely tender surgery to an injured worker or the
beneficial effects of surgery are not admissible in a workers' compensation
case since the trial court has no power to order or to supervise an operation
or determine the advisability of surgery.9 1 The Seelbach rule was further
amplified in Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Villarreal.92 The court did not
allow the insurance carrier's lawyer to cross-examine the injured worker's
doctor about the beneficial effects of proposed surgery even though the
doctor, on direct examination, had already testified on the need for sur-
gery.93 This is one of the few areas in Texas practice in which cross-exam-
ination is restricted even as to matters that have been brought out during
the direct testimony of a witness. Obviously, such testimony can have a
devastating effect on a particular claim since, as in Villarreal, the injured
worker's doctor may well testify that the worker is indeed totally incapaci-
tated at the time of trial even though surgery may well limit or reduce that
total incapacity at a later date.
Death benefits. The Act now allows a widow or widower of a deceased
86. 606 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ dism'd).
87. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
88. 606 S.W.2d at 725.
89. Id; see Holt v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 393 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1965), qf'd, 410 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1966).
90. 606 S.W.2d at 725.
91. 339 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex. 1960).
92. 618 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
93. Id at 104.
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worker to receive weekly compensation benefits for life.94 If remarriage
occurs, however, the carrier is required only to make a lump sum payment
equal to the benefits due for a period of two years.95 Disputes continue to
arise concerning the payment of attorney's fees in a lump sum. This prob-
lem arose again in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Criz.9 6 The
trial court awarded the surviving widow weekly compensation benefits and
granted judgment for a lump sum attorney's fee. The court arrived at the
attorney's fee by reference to the "widow's pension tables," 97 which con-
sider both life expectancy and the expectancy of remarriage. The attor-
ney's fee was calculated at twenty-five percent of the probable future
payments, discounted to present value, as a lump sum fee. The insurance
carrier contended this liability could not be determined by reference to
these tables especially in light of the dual contingencies of both death or
remarriage. The Texarkana court of civil appeals approved the use of the
widow's pension table.98 The court further observed that the amount of
the attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case is a matter for the trial
court to determine without the aid of a jury and the amount of that fee is
within the trial court's discretion.99 The appellate court further observed
that the attorney's fee question has been before Texas appellate courts on
at least three occasions and each time the award of a lump sum attorney's
fee has been approved.'t °
In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Dougharty the Beaumont court of
civil appeals expressed "judicial unease" with the doctrine of allowing
lump sum attorney's fees based on use of the "widow's pension table."' 0 1
The tables were not entered into evidence, but the trial court took judicial
notice of the widow's pension tables and accordingly, allowed the attor-
ney's lump sum fee to be based on the table. Although the appellate court
felt discomfort in sustaining lump sum fees based on a table that was not
entered into evidence, the court did so in accordance with prior decisions
that had allowed such fees.' 0 2 After Dougharty was decided, the Beau-
mont court of appeals was again confronted with the lump sum attorney's
fee issue and the widow's pension table in Texas Employers Insurance As-
94. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(b)(Vernon Supp. 1982).
95. Id
96. 604 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarakana 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. Id at 484. The Widow's Pension table is a table used by the Industrial Accident
Board of Texas to compute the amount of benefits payable to a widow.
98. Id at 485.
99. Id
100. Id (citing Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Motley, 491 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1973); Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Flores, 564 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ramos, 543 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, no writ)).
101. 606 S.W.2d 725, 728-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
102. Id at 729 (citing Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Motley, 491 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1973);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Flores, 564 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ramos, 543 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, no writ)). Id at 729.
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sociation v. Dryden. 103 Again the appellate court approved the trial court's
procedure in taking judicial notice of the widow's pension table, which
apparently was not offered in evidence. °4 The better practice would seem
to be to obtain a certified copy of the table, tender it to opposing counsel
under article 3713,105 and offer it in evidence at trial. Such a procedure
would dispel the objection that the document was not offered in the record.
Third Party Suits. When the actions of a third party other than the em-
ployer contribute to the employee's injury, the employee may sue the third
party to recover damages in addition to the damages he receives under the
Act.10 6 During the past survey year one of the most interesting third-party
suits was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Hafeld v. Anthony Forest Products Co. 107 In that case two workers
received an electric shock while constructing a metal building for Anthony
Forest Products Company. The company contended that the two workers
were covered under its workers' compensation insurance policy and thus
were prohibited from bringing a negligence action against their employer.
The plaintiffs, who operated under the name of a company that, in fact,
did not exist, had been hired by Anthony Forest Products to construct a
new metal building to be used as a dry kiln. Anthony Forest Products did
not withhold any income tax, social security tax, or state unemployment
tax for the plaintiffs and their wages were not reflected in the company's
payroll records; therefore, they were not considered by the insurance com-
pany in calculating the premiums due on the workers' compensation insur-
ance policy. The court of appeals specifically affirmed the lower court's
finding that the defendant had purposely engaged in a course of conduct
designed to circumvent the application of the workers' compensation laws,
and held that such conduct could not defeat the employees' election to
resort to a common-law action for damages.' 08 The court stated that the
employer "cannot complain [of] being left where he chose to place himself
by his policy contract." °9
Limitations problems continue to plague both litigants and appellate
courts in dealing with third-party litigation. The legislature, on September
1, 1973, amended section 6a of article 8307 and eliminated the election
provisions of that statute."l 0 Before this amendment, if the claimant
"elected" to proceed against a third party any rights to compensation bene-
fits were waived. The newest amended version of article 8307, section 6a
allows both a compensation claim and a third-party suit to be prosecuted
103. 612 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
104. Id at 225.
105. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3713 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1982).
106. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
107. 642 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. Id at 177.
109. Id at 178 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Christensen, 149 Tex. 79, 228
S.W.2d 135 (1950)).
110. Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. AN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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simultaneously.' 11 The statute of limitations with respect to filing a claim
against a potential third party is also changed by the amendment. 12 In
Ailbee v. Day' l3 an unusual twist arose when an injured worker also alleg-
edly sustained a medical malpractice injury. In Albee an on-the-job in-
jury occurred on March 25, 1972, before the 1973 amendment to article
8307, section 6a eliminating election provisions. The alleged medical mal-
practice occurred on and after October 31, 1974. The .plaintiff contended
that article 8309, section 3b 4 "saved" the third-party action against the
doctor. That statute provides that "no inchoate, vested, matured existing
or other rights. . . shall be in any way affected by any of the amendments
herein made to the original law. . . ."' 15 The San Antonio court of civil
appeals had no trouble in characterizing the plaintiffs action for medical
malpractice as a third-party claim under article 8307, section 6a.116 The
court ruled, however, that on September 1, 1973, the plaintiff had no right
against the defendant doctor that could be characterized as "vested, ma-
tured [or] existing."'" 7 Since the defendant's tortious conduct did not oc-
cur until after September 1, 1973, the savings clause was inapplicable even
though the on-the-job injury occurred prior to September 1, 1973.
The 1973 amendment to article 8307, section 6a posed another problem
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shelak v.
White Motor Co. 118 Transport Indemnity Company had paid Shelak for
compensation and medical expenses as the result of an on-the-job injury
that had occured in 1972. Transport then moved to intervene in Shelak's
third-party case. After the third-party case was settled, Transport was
awarded its subrogation interest for compensation and medical expenses,
but the trial court refused to grant its request for attorney's fees. The court
additionally awarded a fee to Shelak's lawyers for their role in protecting
Transport's interest. On appeal the Fifth Circuit considered only whether
the district court erred in awarding an attorney's fee to Shelak's lawyers
out of Transport's recovery, instead of awarding Transport an attorney's
fee out of Shelak's lump sum settlement. 119 Transport argued that the
lower court erred by applying the current rather than the pre-amendment
version of article 8307, section 6a to award attorney's fees. The Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed with Transport's argument, finding that the pre-amendment
version of article 8307, section 6a was the applicable law.' 20
An attorney's fee dispute arising out of a third-party case was also the
primary issue in Lindamood v. Link-Belt Corp. 121 The workers' compensa-
111. Id
112. Id
113. 616 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
114. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 3b (Vernon Supp. 1982).
115. Id
116. 616 S.W.2d at 273.
117. Id
118. 636 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. Id at 1072.
120. Id
121. 517 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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tion insurance company intervened in the third-party suit and the plaintiff
reached a settlement with the third party. The plaintiffs attorney then
sought to recover a fee out of the carrier's subrogation recovery relying on
article 8307, section 6a. The court found that the intervenor's counsel ac-
tively represented the carrier to the full extent necessary to protect the car-
rier's subrogation interest and actively participated in obtaining a recovery
from a third party.122 Noting that in this instance "the carrier did not re-
ceive a "free ride' from the [plaintiff's efforts in preparation for trial," the
court refused to award the plaintiffs attorney any fee out of the inter-
venor's recovery under the settlement agreement.1 23
In third-party cases an injured worker's settlement with the third party
will not necessarily terminate the litigation. This was exemplified in
Barnes v. Lone Star Steel Co. 124 Roy Barnes was employed by Seven-O to
repair a roof at the Lone Star Steel plant. Barnes was injured when he fell
through the roof and he sued Lone Star in a third-party action. Lone Star
Steel, in turn, joined Barnes's employer, Seven-O, asserting a contractual
right to indemnity. 25
Barnes had contended that Lone Star was negligent in allowing Seven-O
to begin and to continue work on the roof when Lone Star knew that
Barnes' employer was not complying with the safety requirements of the
contract between Seven-O and Lone Star. A jury returned a verdict in
Barnes's favor finding that Lone Star was one hundred percent negligent,
and that Barnes and Seven-O were free from any negligence. Barnes later
settled with Lone Star which then prosecuted its indemnity action against
Seven-O. Lone Star relied on a purchase order requiring Seven-O to be
responsible for all damages and to indemnify Lone Star against all dam-
ages which arose out of Seven-O's failure to comply with all applicable
laws, ordinances and regulations. 126 SeVen-O argued that since the jury
had found that it was free from any negligent conduct, and since Lone Star
was one hundred percent negligent that it was relieved under the express
negligence rule from its contractual obligations with Lone Star. The ex-
122. Id at 427. The court specifically listed thirteen points that indicated the inter-
venor's counsel's active participation in the case, including review, preparation, and filing of
Complaint in Intervention and brief in support thereof; filing of Answers to Interrogatories;
filing of response to Motion to Compel; inspecting the suspect product; compiling medical
expense summary; writing in excess of 150 letters; arranging five depositions and attending
various others; consulting with other attorneys; and independently negotiating settlement
with the defendant's attorneys. Id at 427-28.
123. Id at 428.
124. 642 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1981).
125. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967) allowing an indemnity
claim by a third party against the employer pursuant to a written indemnity agreement
existing prior to the injury.
126. 642 F.2d at 994. The contract read: "THIS PURCHASE ORDER IS CONDI-
TIONED UPON RECEIPT OF SIGNED COPY OF PURCHASE ORDER ACKNOWL-
EDGEMENT, WHICH INCLUDES GENERAL CONDITIONS COVERING WORK
ON PURCHASER'S PREMISES, COPIES ATTACHED. LONE STAR STEEL PLANT
RULES AND SAFETY REGULATIONS WILL APPLY TO ALL VENDOR EMPLOY-




press negligence rule provides that an agreement to indemnity another for
his own negligence must expressly so state or the agreement is unenforce-
able. 127 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, and held that the jury's
findings of negligence did not control Seven-O's contractual undertakings
with Lone Star.' 28 The court also observed that there was no showing of
any independent negligence on the part of Lone Star separate and apart
from Seven-O's negligence. 129 Although the court acknowledged that
there was no direct Texas precedent, it concluded that a Texas court would
be likely to hold that to escape liability under an indemnity agreement an
indenmitor, like Seven-O's, must show some type of independent negli-
gence on the part of the indemnitee (Lone Star). 130 Since Lone Star's lia-
bility was derived from Seven-O's negligence, the court, therefore, held
that Seven-O was not entitled to invoke the express negligence rule, and
ruled that Lone Star was entitled to judgment on its indemnity claim
against Seven-O.13 1
Suits Against Employers, Nonsubscribers. One of the basic premises under-
lying workers' compensation law in all states is that an employer who car-
ries workers' compensation insurance (a subscriber) is immune from
common law damage suits that might be filed by employees. 132 This im-
munity was one of the original trade-offs made between the employer and
the employee when the original Texas workers' compensation law was en-
acted in 1913. Theroetically, the employee gives up his right to damage
suits against the employer in return for swift, sure compensation payments
arising from on-the-job injuries. In turn, the employer is granted immu-
nity from large damage suits and has its liability limited, but does have to
provide and pay premiums on a workers' compensation insurance policy
to cover its employees for on-the-job injuries.133Since the enactment of the
original 1913 legislation, a Texas employer has been protected against
damage suits for injury or death except in two instances: (1) injuries or
death arising out of an intentional tort committed by the employer, and
(2) wrongful death actions when an employee's homicide was caused by
the willful act or omission or gross negligence of the employer. 34 A
number of important cases during the past survey year both expanded and
explained the two foregoing exceptions. In Castleberry v. Goolsby Building
Corp. 135 the Texas Supreme Court confirmed the general rule that the Act
does not bar a deceased's cause of action for intentional injuries that sur-




131. 642 F.2d at 996. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Exxon Corp., 603 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
1980).
132. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10 (1976). See also TEX.
REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
133. See generally 14 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 340.01 (1982).
134. See TEX. CONST., art. 16, § 26; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4673 (Vernon 1952)
& art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
135. 617 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1981).
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vive to the estate under the general survival statute.'3 6 Richard Castle-
berry was killed in an industrial accident while in the course of his
employment. The administrator of his estate sued the employer claiming
that Castleberry's death was caused by certain "acts and/or omissions to
act, which. . . constitute gross, wanton, and willful negligence," "grossly
negligent acts," "negligent, or grossly negligent, acts and omissions" and
"ordinary or gross negligence."' 137 The employer defended on the ground
that the administrator, in his pleadings, had failed to state a cause of action
for an intentional injury. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 138 The
Texas Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's holding that the ad-
ministrator's allegations of willful negligence and willful gross negligence
were insufficient to give the employer's lawyer fair notice that the cause of
action was for an intentional injury.139 The court further observed that an
injury caused by willful negligence or willful "gross" negligence is not an
intentional injury sufficient to avoid the effect of the Act.140
Cases continue to be litigated concerning whether or not Texas will fol-
low the "dual capacity" exception to the exclusive remedy provisions pro-
vided in the workers' compensation statute. Generally, the "dual
capacity" doctrine does away with employer immunity if there is a legal
relationship with the employee independent of the employer-employee sta-
tus. 141 In Mot v. Mitsubishi International Corp. 142 the deceased employee
worked as a battery salesman for Union Carbide Company, and during
the course of his employment contracted amyotrophic lateral schlerosis,
which allegedly was caused by his handling of defective batteries. The suit
was based on a products liability theory, thereby avoiding the immunity
granted the employer under the workers' compensation law. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, Union Car-
bide, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed noting that Texas had rejected the dual
capacity argument in Cohn v. Spinks Industries, Inc. 143
Another plaintiff sought to recover under the "dual capacity" doctrine in
136. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1967).
137. 617 S.W.2d at 666.
138. For the lower court opinion, see Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 608 S.W.2d
763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi, 1980).
139. 617 S.W.2d at 666.
140. Id
141. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1967). The dual capacity doctrine is
explained in A. LARSON, 2A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.80 (1976). The author
states:
Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the
exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if
he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that
confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as an
employer.
Id
142. 636 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1981).
143. Id at 1074. See Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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an injury context in Gore v. Amoco Production Co. 144 Gore was injured
when she fell over a roll of carpeting lying in the hallway of her employer's
premises during the course of remodeling work. Alleging that the em-
ployer was acting in a dual capacity, both as an employer and as an occu-
pier of the premises, the plaintiff sought to circumvent the exclusivity
provisions of the Act.' 45 The court of civil appeals observed that an em-
ployee has no common law right of action to recover damages for injuries
sustained in the course of employment unless the employer is properly no-
tified in accordance with the Act when the employment contract is cre-
ated.' 46 In rejecting the plaintiff's arguments that the "dual capacity"
doctrine should be followed, the Cohn case was again relied on to re-estab-
lish the principle that the Act remedies constitute the exclusive remedy
that an employee has against his employer. 147
The difficulties and legal barriers involved in prosecuting a wrongful
death action for exemplary damages against a Texas employer are no-
where better illustrated than in the court of civil appeals' opinion in Mis-
souri Valley, Inc. v. Putman.148 Haskell B. Putman, Jr., a construction
employee of Missouri Valley, Inc., was engaged in constructing a power
plant, and was fatally injured during the course of employment when he
fell through an unbarricaded hole in an upper floor of the plant. Putman's
widow and beneficiaries received workers' compensation benefits. The
wrongful death action was brought by Putman's widow, children and par-
ents to recover exemplary damages from Missouri Valley as authorized by
law when an employee's death is caused by a willful act, omission or gross
negligence of the employer.' 49 Missouri Valley argued that there was no
evidence of gross negligence on its part since it had instituted its own
safety rules and orders to complement those promulgated by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration and has held weekly safety meet-
ings in order to instill safety consciousness in its employees. The Amarillo
court relied on a line of cases going back to 1888150 in observing that the
definition of "gross negligence" constituted in entire want of care that
would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result
of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the persons affected by
144. 606 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
145. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967) provides that "[tihe em-
ployees of a subscriber ... shall have no right of action against their employer... but such
employees and their representatives and beneficiaries shall look for compensation solely to
the association as the same is hereinafter provided for."
146. 616 S.W.2d at 290. See TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
147. 616 S.W.2d at 290.
148. 604 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980), rev'd, 616 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.
1981).
149. Id at 546. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) (authoriz-
ing exemplary damages).
150. The definition of gross negligence was first announced in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (1888) and thereafter followed in Sheffield Div., Armco
Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 ('rex. 1964); Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d
1022 (1943); Bennet v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
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it.15 1 The court concluded that the record did not prove an "entire" want
of care because there was some evidence that Missouri Valley had a safety
program thereby reflecting at least some care and concern for the safety
and welfare of its employees. 52 The court, therefore, held that as a matter
of law there was "no evidence" to support the jury findings of gross negli-
gence. 1 53 On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that there was "some"
evidence to support the jury's verdict, but reversed and remanded the case
to the court of civil appeals for determination of other points of error. 154
On the same day that Putman was remanded to the Amarillo court of
civil appeals, the Texas Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Burk
Royalty Co. v. Walls.155 On November 8, 1974, Jeff Walls, an employee of
Burk Royalty, was working at an oil well site in Rusk County, Texas. He
was a member of a four-man crew pulling wet tubing from an oil well so
that the pump at the bottom could be replaced and production reinstated.
While Walls was working about twenty-five feet above the derrick floor,
pressurized gas escaped causing oil to spew out of the tubing, covering
Walls' body with oil. The gas ignited and shot flames to the top of the
derrick igniting the oil on Walls' body. He struggled to get out of his
safety belt but couldn't. Since there were no fire extinguishers at the well
site, the other crew members tried to extinguish the fire on Walls' body by
throwing buckets of water at him. The jury found that the safety supervi-
sor for Burk Royalty failed to follow approved safety practices in pulling
wet tubing and that such failure constituted gross negligence.' 56 Burk
Royalty, relying on Armco Steel 157 and its progeny, defended on the
grounds that there was no evidence of an "entire want of care" amounting
to a conscious indifference that would support an award of exemplary
damages.
In a scholarly opinion by Justice Spears, the supreme court initially ob-
served that the development of the gross negligence concept in Texas has
been somewhat confusing, thus necessitating a careful review of its histori-
cal development.' 58 The court then proceeded to review the history of
gross negligence in three different settings: (1) the Texas Railroad Statute
151. 604 S.W.2d at 547.
152. Id at 548.
153. Id
154. Putman v. Missouri Valley, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. 1981).
155. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
156. 616 S.W.2d at 914. The trial court gave the following instruction accompanying the
"gross negligence" special issue:
You are instructed in connection with the foregoing Special Issue that 'gross
negligence' is the exercise of so little care as to justify the belief that such
action was a heedless and reckless disregard to the safety of Jeffrey Paul Walls
and others.
'Heedless and reckless disregard' means more than momentary thoughtless-
ness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means such an entire want of care
as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious
indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it.
Id at 915.
157. Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
158. 616 S.W.2d at 915-16.
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period; (2) the workers' compensation cases; and (3) the guest statute. 5 9
The definition of gross negligence set forth in Missouri Pacfc Railway v.
Shuford160 was cited as the most representative of the Texas Railroad Stat-
ute period.161 Shuford was the case in which the Texas Supreme Court
first used the phrase "entire want of care" in conjunction with the gross
negligence concept. 162
The court next examined the gross negligence concept in workers' com-
pensation cases. In the early period from 1913 until around 1914 the court
noted that some plaintiffs recovered under both the workers' compensation
statute and under a claim for gross negligence.' 63 During the same period,
the "some care" test surfaced with the Texas appellate courts holding that
if there was any act evidencing "some care" that act took the transaction
out of the definition of gross negligence.'6 The court also noted that a
thorough search of the appellate decisions in Texas revealed that no in-
jured worker had recovered against an employer under the some care
test.' 65 Analysis of the gross negligence concept within the framework of
the "guest statute"' 66 prohibiting a guest in a motor vehicle from recover-
ing from the owner or operator of the vehicle unless the accident was in-
tentional on the part of the owner or operator or was caused by his
heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others was the court's
next step.' 67 After an exhaustive review of the cases the supreme court
concluded that although the correct definition of "gross negligence" was
set out in the Shuford case, the source of confusion stemmed from the
application of that definition.' 68 The court noted that if a jury finds gross
negligence the defendant, on appeal, has the burden of establishing that
there was "no evidence" to support the jury's finding. 169 Justice Spears
stated that the "some care" test utilized in prior workers' compensation
cases improperly shifted the burden to the plaintiff to negate the existence
of some care, an almost impossible task since anything might amount to
159. Id at 916-20.
160. 72 Tex. 165, 10 S.W. 408 (1888).
161. 616 S.W.2d at 917.
162. 72 Tex. at 171, 10 S.W. at 411.
163. 616 S.W.2d at 918.
164. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ford, 14 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1929), writ ref'd per curiam, 118 Tex. 461, 17 S.W.2d 36 (1929).
165. 616 S.W.2d at 919. The court specifically listed Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Co., 488 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1974); Woolard v. Mobil Pipeline Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973); Sheffield
Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964); Missouri Valley, Inc. v.
Putman, 604 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980), rek'd, 616 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.
1981); Delgadilio v. Tex-Con Util. Contractors, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1975, writ rerd n.r.e.); Thomas v. T.C. Bateson Co., 437 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stephens v. Dunn, 417 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, no writ); LeJeune v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 410 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Loyd Elec. Co. v. DeHoyos, 409 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966, writ refrd); Armstrong v. Texas Power & Light, 399 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6710b (Vernon 1967).
167. 616 S.W.2d at 919-20.
168. Id. at 920.
169. Id at 920-21.
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some care.' 70 The court went on to conclude that what converted ordinary
negligence into gross negligence was the mental state of the defendant.' 71
The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously indifferent to
his rights, welfare, and safety and that the defendant knew about the peril,
but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he did not care.' 72 Finally, the
court held that "[n]o justification exists for having a different standard for
reviewing gross negligence findings in employer cases than in other type
cases," and accordingly, it disapproved the-use of the "some care" test in
determining legal sufficiency points.'73
In an unusual fact situation from a procedural standpoint, wrongful
death beneficiaries were prevented from recovering against an employer in
Puga v. Donna Fruit Co. 74 The surviving beneficiaries of Juan Torrez
sought to recover in a statutory "wrongful death action"' 75 against the
Donna Fruit Company, allegedly Torrez's employer. The Industrial Acci-
dent Board entered an order stating that the evidence submitted failed to
establish that the decedent was an employee of Donna Fruit Company at
the time of his demise.
Prior to the ruling of the Industrial Accident Board the beneficiaries
filed their damage suit in state district court. Donna Fruit Company
moved for and was granted dismissal and summary judgment. Because no
appeal was taken from the Board award and no new independent theories
of recovery were submitted at the trial court level, the trial court's order for
summary judgment was affirmed.176 Puga apparently stands for the rather
unusual proposition that the employer cannot be sued in a separate action
but only by appealing from a negative award of the Industrial Accident
Board, even though the Industrial Accident Board may have found that an
employee was not employed by a particular employer. It should be noted
that the Texas Supreme Court has granted the writ of error in this case. 177
Wrongful Discharge. An injured worker may file suit against an employer
who discharges or discriminates against him for filing a compensation
170. Id at 921.
171. Id at 922.
172. Id
173. Id The court specifically overruled the "some care" test and Texas cases applying
it. See, e.g., Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964); Mis-
souri Valley, Inc. v. Putman, 604 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980), rev'd, 616
S.W.2d 930 (Tex. 1981); Delgadilio v. Tex-Con Util. Contractors, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thomas v. T.C. Bateson Co., 437 S.W.2d 386
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stephens v. Dunn, 417 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ); LeJeune v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 410 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Loyd Elec. Co. v. DeHoyos, 409 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ refd); Armstrong v. Texas Power & Light, 399 S.W.2d
922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
174. 616 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ granted).
175. The action was brought pursuant to Tx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon
Supp. 1982).
176. 616 S.W.2d at 667.
177. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 14 (Oct. 14, 1981).
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claim, hiring a lawyer or instituting any proceedings under the Act. 178 A
problem sometimes arises in these suits when the employee is also covered
by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that establishes a griev-
ance procedure in the event of a discharge or other disciplinary action.
These issues were illustrated in Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards. 79 Willie D.
Richards was injured on the job and went to the company clinic. After
heated words were spoken, Richards was suspended. The employer and
union later conducted a hearing, and Richards' suspension was converted
to a discharge for just cause. An additional review before an employer
representative again upheld the discharge. No additional action was taken
by the union or Richards pursuant to the grievance procedure. Richards
then filed a lawsuit against his employer pursuant to article 8307c.' 80 The
trial court entered judgment for Richards, and the employer appealed, as-
serting Richards's claim was barred by the final adverse determination re-
garding his discharge pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure
established between his union and employer. The court of civil appeals
noted that The Texas Supreme Court recently had held in Carnation Co. v.
Borner'8' that an employee could pursue his wrongful discharge claim if
no resolution was made during the grievance process.' 82 The court in
Richards held that one who elects to proceed through a grievance proce-
dure provided in the contract between his union and his employer may not
then file suit under article 8307c after a "final settlement or determination"
has been made following a grievance hearing pursuant to the employment
contract. 8 3 In addition, the court stated that the employee must choose,
before a final settlement of the grievance, whether he wishes to file suit
under article 8307c or proceed under the employment contract. 8 4 The
court noted that Richards had taken no further action in the grievance
process and the matter was not submitted to final arbitration which was
the final step under the contract between the union and the employer. 8 5
Nevertheless, the court of civil appeals concluded that Richards had
reached a final settlement and thus was precluded from filing Suit.186 The
Texas Supreme Court, however, in a per curiam opinion reversed, holding
that "only the first step" of the grievance procedure was actually followed
178. TEX. REy. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1982).
179. 610 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980), rev'dper curiam, 615
S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1981).
180. TEX. REv. Cir. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides that:
no person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer
to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith,
any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or has testi-
fied or is about to testify in any such proceeding.
181. 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
182. 610 S.W.2d at 234.
183. Id at 235. The court limited its holding to those situations in which the union has
not breached its duty of fair representation. Id See Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559
S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
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in the Richards case, and since no "final determination" was reached and
Richards was not barred from suing his employer for wrongful
discharge. 187
The holding of the court of civil appeals in Richards illustrates the
problems that can arise when an appellate court writes an "election" pro-
cedure into the statute even though it is unlikely that such a procedure was
intended by the legislature. Nothing in the language of article 8307c sug-
gests that the employee is put to any kind of election or is forced to give up
any existing rights which he may hold under a collective bargaining con-
tract. Part of the fallacy involved in the court of civil appeals' reasoning in
Richards centers around the union decision not to proceed to further
stages in the grievance process. A union may decide not to proceed further
with the matter for reasons separate and apart from the merits of the em-
ployee's grievance. The union may be considering other interests of mem-
bers of the bargaining unit in addition to the merits of the individual
grievance. A discharged employee may well have a meritorious claim
under the collective bargaining agreement even though his union chooses
not to pursue his grievance to a "final settlement." Any forced "election"
of remedies puts a very strenuous burden on the discharged worker who
must decide whether to "elect" to proceed under the collective bargaining
contract or to proceed with a suit for wrongful discharge under article
8307c. Considering the current state of the law in this area it is doubtful
that even knowledgeable lawyers would relish the task of making the
decision.
In.Spainhouer v. Western Electric Co. 188 the Texas Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of whether an injured worker was barred from suing
her employer after having filed a grievance under the collective bargaining
agreement with her employer. Anna Spainhouer was a memmer of the
Communications Workers of America and was discharged following an
on-the-job injury. The collective bargaining agreement provided for five
steps in a grievance situation to be followed by binding arbitration at the
option of either party. After the fifth step had been completed in
Spainhouer's case, the local. union submitted the matter to the district of-
fice of the international union that declined to ask for 'arbitration.
Spainhouer then sued Western Electric Company, Inc., pursuant to article
8307c. The supreme court held that there was no "final determination" in
this case since it had not been submitted to arbitration, and there had been
no ruling by the arbitrator. 89 An interesting point was raised by the em-
ployer who contended that section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act' 90 preempted any action under article 8307c. The supreme court
187. 615 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex. 1981).
188. 615 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1981).
189. Id at 191.
190. The Labor-Management Relations statute provides that "[sluits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees. . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (emphasis added).
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declined to rule on that point, however, since there were no pleadings or
evidence to raise the issue. 91
In Deford Lumber Co. v. Roys 192 a discharged worker sued his employer
on the theory that he was wrongfully discharged solely because he filed a
workers' compensation claim and had hired an attorney to represent him.
The Dallas court of civil appeals ruled that no direct evidence was intro-
duced to prove the fact that the worker was discharged solely because he
filed a claim and hired an attorney.193 The court noted that the worker's
own testimony that he was fired without a reason, that he was denied in-
surance benefits, that his insurance costs would be $15.00 a month higher,
that at his age it was difficult to get work, and that he did not think "that's
the way to do a person" constituted no evidence of wrongful discharge
under the Act.' 94
A jury finding in favor of an injured worker in a wrongful discharge
action was set aside in Douglas v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co. because of a
misrepresentation made by the worker in his application for employ-
ment.195 Prior to his employment with Levingston, Douglas was employed
by Drilco where he had sustained an injury to his hand. When Levingston
learned that Douglas had filed a claim for workers' compensation against
Drilco, it fired Douglas. Douglas had not disclosed to Levingston that he
was previously employed by Drilco or that he had ever filed a claim for
workers' compensation benefits. Douglas sued Levingston for wrongful
discharge and Levingston defended on the ground that Douglas was termi-
nated solely because he had falsified his application for employment. In
affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer the court of civil
appeals noted Douglas had agreed that Levingston could terminate his
employment in the event he made false representations.' 96 The court,
therefore, held Douglas was estopped by his contract of employment from
taking the position that his discharge was wrongful. 197
IndustrialAccident Board Procedures. Following a settlement or other dis-
position of a claim for an on-the-job injury, article 8306, section 12d of the
Act allows an injured worker to petition the Industrial Accident Board for
additional compensation when there has been a change in the employee's
physical condition.' 98 The Texas Supreme Court considered an em-
ployee's claim of changed condition in Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guaranty In-
191. 615 S.W.2d at 191.
192. 615 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
193. Id at 237.
194. Id
195. 617 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
196. The employment application provided that "[t]he applicant in making application
for employment understands and agrees ... that any misrepresentation made by him in this
application will be sufficient cause for cancellation of the application and/or for separation
from Company's service if he has been employed." The applicant, by signature, authorized
full investigation of the contents of the application. Id at 719.
197. Id at 720.
198. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (Vernon 1967).
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surance Underwriters, Inc. 199 Celedonio R. Mendoza was injured on the
job in January of 1976 following which the Industrial Accident Board en-
tered a compensation award in November of 1976 for approximately
$2,000.00. This award was not appealed and became final. Shortly there-
after Mendoza again sought medical treatment for new physical complica-
tions, and filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board to modify the
previous award on the basis of a subsequent change in his physical condi-
tion. The Board refused to modify its earlier award, and Mendoza filed
suit in district court. The jury returned a verdict in Mendoza's favor, and
the insurance carrier appealed. The insurer claimed that Mendoza's testi-
mony that he was unable to work prior to the Industrial Accident Board
award of November 30, 1976, was a judicial admission of total disability at
that time thereby precluding a further change in his work capacity. The
supreme court affirmed the trial court finding, concluding that although
Mendoza's trial testimony constituted a quasi-admission, it was not a judi-
cial admission. 2°° The Court reasoned that because Mendoza's testimony
was essentially the testimony of a lay witness, it could not be conclusive on
the issue of his physical condition.20'
The Workers' Compensation Act requires certain steps to establish juris-
diction.202 One of these steps is that the proper insurance company must
have notice of proceedings before the Board, and if the insurance company
is not a party to the proceedings, then the Board is without jurisdiction to
enter a valid and enforceable award.203 Such an instance arose in the case
of Owens v. Travelers Insurance Co. 204 In May of 1976 Charlie Owens was
injured in the course and scope of his employment for Swifty Systems, Inc.
Some confusion about the proper insurance carrier for Owens' employer
existed. Owens filed an amended notice of injury naming the insurance
carrier as "Travelers Insurance Company and/or Travelers Indemnity
Company of Rhode Island." As it turned out, the Industrial Accident
Board by mistake rendered its award against the Travelers Insurance
Company rather than the Travelers Indemnity Company of Rhode Island,
the actual insurer at the time of Owens' accident. Owens then sued Travel-
ers Insurance Company seeking to enforce the Board award. Travelers
argued that since it was not a party to the proceedings before the Industrial
Accident Board and had no notice of any hearing that the Industrial Acci-
dent Board was without jurisdiction to enter an award against it, and
therefore the trial court likewise lacked jurisdiction to hear Owens' appeal.
The trial court dismissed with prejudice Owens' action. The Amarillo
court of civil appeals agreed with the trial court's acceptance of Travelers'
199. 606 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1980).
200. Id at 695.
201. Id
202. Although not technically "jurisdictional" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307
(Vernon 1967) sets forth several requirements including notice to all parties, the right to be
heard, a quorum of the board to be present.
203. See Carpenter v. Gulf Ins. Co., 515 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1976, no writ).
204. 607 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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argument stating that when the Board was without jurisdiction to render a
valid and enforceable award against the Travelers Insurance Company,
the court was also without jurisdiction to mature that award. 205
Article 8306, section 12d generally empowers the Industrial Accident
Board to review and modify any order previously made that was errone-
ously based upon fraud, mistake, or when conditions have subsequently
changed.206 This statute was the subject of another appellate opinion in
Anderson v. New York Underwriters Insurance Co. 207 In Anderson the In-
dustrial Accident Board declined to change an earlier final Board award
denying Melba Anderson's claim for compensation benefits. The Board,
on June 26, 1978, had refused to find that the claimant sustained a com-
pensable injury in the course of employment. No notice of appeal was
given in that case. Anderson filed a motion for a review of the Board's
June 1978 award, and at a second hearing the Board specifically found that
there was no mistake made as contemplated by article 8306, section 12d.
The Board, therefore, declined to change its earlier award. On appeal, the
trial court granted summary judgment against Anderson. The court of
civil appeals affirmed, noting that although the trial court may have had
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Board's decision, there was no
evidence in the record that would justify a finding of mistake. 20 8 The court
stated that article 8306, section 12d requires a mistake of fact as to actual
injuries received by the claimant whether made by the employee, the in-
surer or the Board itself, irrespective and independent of any issue of
fraud. 2°9 Further the court found that the only kind of "mistake" that
Anderson had alleged was that the Board was mistaken in "judgment" in
denying her claim, and the court stated that the remedy for this type of
mistake was to perfect an appeal to the proper court and not a review by
the Industrial Accident Board under article 8306, section 12d.210
Suits to Enforce Compromise Settlement Agreements. In Home Indemnity
Co. v. Rios the Austin court of civil appeals reversed a trial court's award
of an attorney's fee and penalty under article 8307, sections 5 and 5a21' in
a suit to enforce a compromise settlement agreement. 212 The insurance
carrier and Rios, an injured worker, had entered into a compromise settle-
ment agreement but the award was not paid within twenty days after the
agreement had been approved by the Industrial Accident Board. Thereaf-
ter Rios sued to enforce the agreement and collect a statutory attorney's fee
and a twelve percent penalty. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and
awarded the requested changes. The insurance carrier appealed contend-
205. Id at 638.
206. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (Vernon 1967).
207. 613 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
208. Id at 19.
209. Id See also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Foster, 537 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
210. 613 S.W.2d at 19.
211. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, §§ 5, 5a (Vernon 1967).
212. 617 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ing that the statutory attorney's fee and penalty could not be recovered in a
suit to enforce a compromise settlement agreement since the agreement
was not a "final order, ruling or decision" as required by article 8307, sec-
tion 5a. The Austin court of civil appeals noted that there were authorities
to support the injured worker's position 21 3 but held for the insurance car-
rier relying on an Industrial Accident Board rule that stated: "Failure to
tender payment within such time shall cause the board to immediately set
such case for formal hearing for the purpose of invoking proper sanc-
tions. ' 214 The court thus indicated that only the Board, not the trial court,
could award such penalties and attorney's fees.215 The appellate court fur-
ther relied on two earlier cases, Pearce v. Texas Employers' Insurance Asso-
ciation216 and Barnes v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. 217, that held that a
statutory cause of action for penalty and attorney's fees could not be
founded on a compromise settlement agreement.218
Wage Rate. Despite the importance of the proper wage rate in every com-
pensation claim, there was only one reported appellate case dealing with
the issue during this past survey year. In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Johnson
219
there was a dispute as to whether a death claim beneficiary was entitled to
rely on article 8309, section 1(3).220 Generally, computation of a wage rate
based on the "just and fair" provisions of article 8309, section 1(3) is avail-
able to a claimant only if an average weekly wage cannot be computed
under the first two subsections to article 8309, section 1.221 When neither
the claimant nor any other employee in his class has worked at least 210
days of the year immediately preceeding the claimant's death, an average
weekly wage rate cannot be computed under the first two subsections and
wages may be determined under subsection 3.222 In Johnson the deceased
employee was employed as a dishwasher at a recreational youth camp. In
addition to an hourly wage, his compensation included room and board
and the opportunity to participate in horseback riding, fishing, canoeing
and swimming activities at the camp. He had only worked thirteen to
fourteen days for this particular ranch, and there was no evidence of any
person who worked at least 210 days in the same or similar capacity. The
appellate court, therefore, held that the evidence was sufficient to show
that the decedent's wage rate could not be established by any method other
213. Id at 800. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 150 Tex. 441, 242 S.W.2d
185 (1951); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Escalante, 484 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.).
214. 617 S.W.2d at 800. See Tex. Indus. Accid. Bd. Rule 061.08.00.220, 2 Tex. Reg. 4322
(1977).
215. 617 S.W.2d at 800-01.
216. 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1967).
217. 495 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
218. 617 S.W.2d at 801.
219. 616 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
220. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(3) (Vernon 1967).
221. Id art. 8309, § 1.
222. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, no writ). For a discussion of the Miller case, see Collins, supra note 40 at 283.
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than by use of the "just and fair" provisions of article 8309.223
Occupational Disease-Notice. Article 8307, section 4a requires an injured
worker to give notice of injury "within 30 days after the happening of an
injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease. '224
The term "injury" as used in the Act also encompasses an occupational
disease.225 The Texas Supreme Court considered the question of what
constitutes proper notice to the employer in DeAnda v. Home Insurance
Co. 226 Porfirio DeAnda sustained a back injury occasioned by an occupa-
tional disease that had resulted from repetitious physical traumatic activ-
ity. DeAnda was working as a welder's helper when he injured his back
lifting steel. He later sustained additional lifting injuries while on the job.
DeAnda reported to the company nurse and went to the company doctor
over a five or six month period. After each visit the company doctor sent
letters to DeAnda's employer describing his condition. DeAnda filed suit
and the insurance carrier defended on the ground that the employer did
not have actual notice of the occupational disease within thirty days after it
became disabling. In affirming the trial court's judgment in DeAnda's
favor, the supreme court reiterated some of the principles governing "no-
tice" disputes:
1. no particular form or manner of notice is required; 227
2. "notice" can be dispensed with when the employer or insurer has
actual knowledge of the injury or occupational disease;228
3. the "actual knowledge" need not apprise the employer of the ex-
act time, place and extent of injury;229 and
4. great liberality should be indulged in determining the sufficiency
and scope of the notice. 230
The supreme court relied on these principles to conclude that there was
ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the em-
ployer had actual knowledge of DeAnda's occupational disease within
thirty days of his disability.23' The court noted that the company was on
notice that DeAnda was seeing the company physician and had received
medical reports from the company doctor and nurse.232 In addition, the
court stated that DeAnda had missed seventeen days of work due to his
back injury.233
223. 616 S.W.2d at 326.
224. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
225. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
226. 618 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1980).
227. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Bradshaw, 27 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1930, writ ref'd).
228. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fricker, 16 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1929, writ rerd).
229. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Bradshaw, 27 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1930, writ ref'd).
230. See Lewis v. American Sur. Co., 143 Tex. 286, 184 S.W.2d 137 (1944).
231. 618 S.W.2d at 533.
232. Id. at 534.
233. Id
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